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Abstract:  
The aim of this paper is to show that regulatory risk is due to the discretionary 
behaviour of regulatory agencies, caused by a too extensive regulatory mandate 
provided by the legislator. The normative point of reference and a behavioural 
model of regulatory agencies based on the positive theory of regulation are   
presented. Regulatory risk with regard to the future behaviour of regulatory 
agencies is modelled as the consequence of the ex ante uncertainty about the 
relative influence of interest groups in the regulatory process. The problem of 
regulatory risk is analysed separately in competitive network areas and in non-
competitive network areas. For both cases a specific measure of regulatory risk 
is proposed. But measurement and compensation are different issues. The im-
possibility of compensating for regulatory risk is demonstrated. Finally, the dis-
aggregated regulatory mandate is presented as an institutional reform approach. 
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1. Introduction   
 
In the current debate on regulatory reforms the issue of regulatory risk gains in-
creasing importance. Several definitions of regulatory risk are known from the 
economic literature, e.g.: “[R]egulatory risk arises whenever regulation affects 
the cost of capital of the regulated firm” (Wright, Mason, Miles, 2003, p. 118). 
“Regulatory risk arises when the interaction of uncertainty and regulation 
changes the cost of financing the operations of a firm” (Ergas et al., 2001, p. 5.). 
In general, these definitions of regulatory risk do not differentiate systematically 
between, on the one hand, the impacts of a specific regulatory intervention on 
the risk of the regulated firms, or – more generally – on the social welfare (regu-
latory impact) and, on the other hand, uncertainties arising from the discretion-
ary behavior of regulatory agencies.  
 
Effective regulation changes the systematic risk of the regulated activities, 
thereby (ceteris paribus) leading to increasing or decreasing opportunity costs of 
the invested capital (cf. Gaggero, 2007). The impact of regulation on the entre-
preneurial risk and therefore the cost of equity capital are neither a normative 
justification for regulatory interventions in competitive markets, nor are they an 
argument against necessary regulatory interventions to discipline market power. 
Instead they ought to be treated as positive or negative side effects of regulation. 
In competitive markets regulation should obviously never be introduced in order 
to mitigate the risk of the firms involved. In those parts of network industries 
where network-specific market power is still present, the risk of the business 
under regulated conditions has to be taken into account. Neither the risk of the 
unregulated monopolist nor the risk of the business under hypothetical condi-
tions of competition should therefore be considered as relevant reference points 
(see Myers, 1972, pp. 79-81; Buckland, Fraser, 2001, p. 879).  
 
It is important to differentiate between regulatory impact and regulatory risk due 
to discretionary agency behaviour. From the perspective of the public interest 
theory of regulation, regulatory agencies are considered to behave in a welfare-
maximising manner (cf. Posner, 1974, pp. 336 ff.). Ahn, Thompson (1989), for 
example, analysed the regulatory risk surrounding the triggering of a rate case   2
(triggering risk) and uncertainties surrounding the setting of the allowed rate of 
return (setting risk) in the context of the implementation of rate-of-return regula-
tion. In Ahn, Thompson the "error terms" surrounding the implementation of the 
regulatory instrument are distributed symmetrically, so there is no systematic 
bias in one direction. Thus regulatory risk is treated in the context of a welfare-
maximising agency, implementing a given regulatory instrument in a given 
regulatory framework. 
 
It is well-known from the positive theory of regulation that regulatory agencies 
cannot commit to welfare-maximising behaviour. "A common concern among 
those involved in regulation is that the regulator can itself introduce risk, 
through unpredictable or unjustifiable regulatory intervention, so raising the 
regulated firm’s cost of capital, and leading to inefficient investment" (Wright, 
Mason, Miles, 2003, p. 119). Regulatory agencies make use of their discretion-
ary power in response to the relative influence of the interest groups involved 
(cf. e.g. Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983). 
 
The discretionary behaviour of regulatory agencies has been in particular dis-
cussed in connection with missing investment incentives in regulated industries 
due to regulatory opportunism (e.g. Newbery, 2000; Gans, King, 2003). The fo-
cus of this literature is on the missing commitment ability of regulatory agencies 
vis-à-vis the regulated firms. In particular, regulatory agencies cannot commit 
themselves to allow full cost recovery of the invested capital. As a consequence, 
incentives for underinvestment arise. These are typically termed hold-up prob-
lem, commitment problem or problem of regulatory opportunism. The policy 
focus is on the design of possible compensation mechanisms, especially so-
called access holidays. However, as will be shown in the present paper, compen-
sation mechanisms cannot solve the problem of regulatory opportunism. Policy 
recommendations (e.g. access holidays) which neglect or try to bypass the influ-
ence of interest groups are not credible and therefore cannot compensate for 
regulatory risk. Instead it is necessary to tackle the problem at its roots and to 
constrain the scope of the discretionary behaviour of regulatory agencies. 
   3
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 the normative point of reference 
(2.1) and a behavioural model of regulatory agencies based on the positive the-
ory of regulation are presented (2.2). Regulatory risk with regard to the future 
behaviour of regulatory agencies is modelled as the consequence of the ex ante 
uncertainty about the relative influence of interest groups in the regulatory proc-
ess. In section 3 the problem of regulatory risk in competitive network areas is 
analysed. Section 4 deals with regulatory risk in non-competitive network areas. 
For both cases a specific measure of regulatory risk is proposed. But measure-
ment and compensation are different issues. In section 5 the necessity for institu-
tional reform due to the impossibility of compensating for regulatory risk is 




2  Regulatory risk caused by an extensive regulatory mandate 
 
2.1  The normative dimension: Regulatory needs due to monopolistic  
bottlenecks 
 
From the normative point of view it is important to differentiate between those 
parts of a network industry which are competitive and those parts which are 
characterised by network-specific market power. Liberalisation of network in-
dustries does not mean that all sector-specific regulation becomes superfluous. 
In most network industries there remain some non-competitive network areas. 
The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks enables a localisation of the remaining 
network-specific market power in order to determine the minimal regulatory ba-
sis (cf. Knieps, 1997, pp. 327 f.; Knieps, 2006, pp. 53 ff.). Its objective is to de-
rive, based on the principles of network economics, a regulatory basis consistent 
for all network sectors which justifies sector-specific regulatory inventions. The 
conditions for a monopolistic bottleneck are fulfilled: 
(1)  if a facility is necessary for reaching customers, i.e. if no second or third 
such facility exists, in other words if there is no active substitute. This is 
the case if there is a natural monopoly and a single provider is able to make 
the facility available more cheaply than several providers.   4
(2)  if at the same time the facility cannot reasonably be duplicated as a way of 
disciplining the active provider, in other words, if there is no potential sub-
stitute. This is the case if the costs of the facility are irreversible.  
 
The owner of such a monopolistic bottleneck has stable market power, even if 
all players have perfect information and a complete willingness to switch so that 
even small changes in prices result in a migration of demand. Irreversible costs 
are no longer decision-relevant for the established firm – in contrast to the po-
tential competitor, who is faced with the decision whether to invest in a given 
market or not. Thus the incumbent has lower decision-relevant costs than the 
potential competitors. This leads to scope for strategic behaviour, so that ineffi-
cient production or surplus profits no longer necessarily result in newcomers 
entering the market. 
 
Within a given network the entire value chain has to be examined in a disaggre-
gated manner, that is, it has to be differentiated into those network areas that do 
have bottleneck characteristics and the other areas that are characterised by ef-
fective competition. The latter is by no means confined to potential competition. 
Both active and potential competition with and without technological differen-
tiation as well as product differentiation and innovation (of both products and 
processes) constitute potential parameters of effective competition. Due to the 
absence of irreversible costs service networks are competitive, no matter if they 
possess the characteristics of a natural monopoly or not. Competitive network 
areas are subject to general competition law, whereas sector-specific regulation 
is superfluous (or even detrimental). 
 
In non-competitive network areas the application of general competition law is 
not sufficient. Sector-specific regulation is required. The special focus of regula-
tory activities to discipline market power should be on the design of a symmetri-
cal regulation of the access to monopolistic bottlenecks, combined with a price 
level regulation of access charges.
1 The implementation of sector-specific regu-
                                                 
1   Regulatory agencies should not force firms to apply specific pricing structures, such 
as Ramsey prices or two-part tariffs, as this would impede their search for innovative 
pricing systems.   5
latory laws is typically delegated to specialised agencies. The necessity of a  
division of labour between legislative bodies and executive agencies has already 
been pointed out by Posner (1974). Regulatory agencies have more or less scope 
for discretionary activities, depending on the character and the extent of the 
competencies delegated by the legislator to the regulatory agency as specified in 
the regulatory mandate (cf. Spulber, Besanko, 1992). If regulatory agencies are 
successful in guaranteeing non-discriminatory access and avoiding monopolistic 
access prices, welfare improvements occur (cf. Knieps, 2006, pp. 64-69;   
Blankart, Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2007, p. 423). 
 
 
2.2  The positive dimension: Regulatory agencies influenced by interest  
   groups 
 
In the meantime it is well known that regulators do not necessarily act in the 
public interest. The basic hypothesis of the positive theory of regulation is that 
the influence of interest groups is the central explanatory variable in the behav-
iour of a regulatory agency. Trying to influence the decisions of the regulatory 
agency in a favourable direction is in the interest of the participants in the regu-
latory process. Thus, a behavioural model is needed to explain how regulatory 
agencies make use of their discretionary power in response to the relative influ-
ence of the interest groups involved (cf. e.g. Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; 
Becker, 1983).  
 
Already in a simple model context with a homogeneous group of consumer in-
terests and a homogeneous group of producer interests, we can define a function 
M representing the influences on regulatory agencies. For reasons of simplifica-
tion the following Cobb-Douglas function is assumed to represent the concur-
ring influences of the interest groups (cf. Spulber, 1989, pp. 94 ff.; Besanko, 
Spulber, 1992, p. 156): 
    (1) 
α α π π ⋅ Ω = Ω =
− 1 ) , ( M M
   6
The variables Ω and π denote consumer surplus and producer surplus (profit), 
respectively. α is a parameter representing the relative weights of the two inter-
est groups. α can have values in between zero and one. In case of the corner so-
lution α = 0 the regulatory agency acts solely in the interest of consumers (con-
sumer protection hypothesis). In the other extreme, i.e. α = 1, the regulatory 
agency acts solely in the interest of producers (capture hypothesis). In case of  
0 < α < 1 the regulatory agency prefers a weighted average. Given α, the relative 
influence of producers versus the relative influence of consumers can be ex-














MRS  (2) 
In the positive theory of regulation it is usually assumed that the relative influ-
ence of interest groups is exogenously given. Regarding the presumed Cobb-
Douglas function this corresponds to the assumption that α is a given parameter. 
Peltzman considers the extreme case of unlimited discretion on the part of the 
regulator which is not bound by a regulatory mandate. It is assumed that the 
regulator can observe the relative strength of the interest groups and implements 
price and entry regulation accordingly (cf. Peltzman, 1976, pp. 222 ff.).
2  
 
The basic contribution of the Stigler-Peltzman Model is the analysis of the role 
of interest groups in the process of regulation. However, the necessary differen-
tiation between legislator and regulatory agency is lacking (cf. Weingast, 
Moran, 1983, p. 768). It is important to differentiate between the time phase 
when a regulatory law (including a regulatory mandate) is debated and ulti-
mately passed by the legislator (phase 1) and the subsequent implementation by 
a regulatory agency (phase 2). For a given regulatory mandate the legislator can 
foresee that interest groups will be a major determinant of the behaviour of the 
regulatory agency and the resulting regulatory outcome in phase 2. But it would 
be illusionary to assume that the legislator is also able to predict the relative 
strength of the interest groups, i.e. the value of parameter α, with certainty. From 
                                                 
2   Spulber (1989), Besanko, Spulber (1992) and Newbery (2000, Chap. 2) also assume 
that the relative strength of the interest groups is observable and exogenously given.   7
the perspective of the legislator in phase 1 it is therefore necessary to treat pa-
rameter α and the implied influence function M(α) as uncertain. At best the leg-
islator can form rational expectations about a probability distribution θ of the 
possible realisations of the uncertain parameter α in phase 2 (see Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1: The two-phases approach to analysing regulatory risk 
 
Phase 1  Phase 2 
Legislatory body sets 
the regulatory framework 
(incl. the mandate) 
Regulatory agency 
subsequently implements 
the regulatory framework 
M(αi) as a deterministic function  M(•) as a stochastic function 
 
The stochastic influence function does not only substantiate regulatory risk, but 
can also serve as a definite starting point for its measurement. In the following, a 
discrete characterisation of regulatory risk is chosen. M(αi) denotes the influence 
function when parameter αi is realised as indicator of relative interest group in-
fluences. Then we have 
    (3) 
i i ) ; , ( M ) ( M i i
α α π α π α ⋅ Ω = Ω =
− 1
If for future influence parameters α = (α1, ..., αn) an associated probability distri-
bution θ = (θ1, ..., θn) is known, a measure of regulatory risk can be developed 
which is not restricted unilaterally to producer effects (cost of capital).
3 Only 
one-sided risk measures are of interest, because from the point of view of nor-
mative theory the influence of interest groups on the regulatory process always 
leads to welfare losses. Based on Stone (1973) and his general characterisation 
of risk measures, in the following a one-sided risk measure in the sense of an 
                                                 
3   Models in the tradition of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which are usu-
ally used to analyse the impact of regulation on the cost of capital of firms, are not 
able to represent the impact on consumer interests (cf. Myers, 1972, pp. 65 ff.).   8
expected deviation from a target value is used (cf. Ebert, 2005, pp. 20 ff.). Con-
cerning the problem of the measurement of regulatory risk, it follows that any 
M(αi) gives rise to a welfare level W(αi), the sum of consumer surplus Ω(αi) and 
producer surplus π(αi). The welfare level W(αi) may deviate from the welfare 
optimum W
Opt indicating the attainable outcome from the normative point of 
view. In this paper we propose to measure regulatory risk by the following one-
sided risk measure:
4
   ∑ ⋅ − =
i
i i
Opt ) ( W W α θ ρ  (4) 
 
For every probability distribution θ = (θ1, ..., θn) of the influence parameter   
α = (α1, ..., αn) regulatory risk is measured as expected welfare loss. 
 
The possible welfare losses due to misregulation are quite different in competi-
tive and non-competitive network areas. Therefore a deeper analysis of regula-
tory risk requires a disaggregated approach as its normative foundation. Based 
on the normative framework explained in section 2.1, in the following two   
sections the regulatory risk in competitive network areas (section 3) and the 




3  Regulatory risk in competitive network areas 
 
As long as network industries were treated as special sectors exempted from 
general competition law and network providers were protected against market 
entry by legal entry barriers, the choice of the regulatory basis was not regarded 
as problematic in the process of implementing regulatory instruments. In the 
U.S., for example, rate-of-return regulation was applied globally to the regulated 
firm. But also after the liberalisation of network industries, overregulation may 
occur due to discriminatory behaviour of regulatory agencies. Examples are the 
                                                 
4   In the present context it is sufficient to take the expected value of the welfare loss as 
risk measure. It belongs to a popular class of downside risk measures called lower 
partial moments (cf. Ebert, 2005, pp. 22 f.).   9
regulation of telecommunications service markets (e.g. Knieps, 2005), the regu-
lation of local transportation services (e.g. Weiss, 2006) or long distance bus 
services (e.g. Maertens, 2005). 
 
Figure 2: Regulatory risk in competitive network areas 
 
 
In the following the risk of a regulatory intervention in competitive network ar-
eas due to the discretionary behaviour of regulatory agencies will be analysed. 
Because any regulatory intervention in competitive markets leads to welfare 
losses, we can derive a regulatory production possibility set whose efficient sur-






















π   10
T(π(p), Ω(p)) = 0 as shown in figure 2 (cf. Spulber, 1989, p. 95, fig. 2.3.1).  
Ω(p) and π(p) denote consumer surplus and profit, both depending on the price. 
Consumer surplus is maximised with competitive price p
c and zero profit. In this 
case welfare level W(p
c) is reached. Profit is maximised with monopoly price 
p
m. Due to the dead-weight loss of monopolistic price setting, in this case only 
the lower welfare level W(p
m) is reached. 
 
To clarify the argument, in the following the case of a regulatory agency with 
unlimited competencies (delegated by the legislator) is analysed. Depending on 
the relative influence of interest groups (parameter αi) the agency will choose a 
point a(αi) on T between W(p
c) and W(p
m), realising it by appropriate price set-
ting.
5 The maximum welfare level W(p
c) follows from the maximisation of the 
influence function M subject to the constraint of the transformation function in 
the special case of α = 0. The (lowest) welfare level W(p
m) is the result in the 
special case α = 1. For any parameter  ) , ( i 1 0 ∈ α  the maximisation of influence 
function M(αi) with respect to T leads to a welfare-inferior outcome W(αi) with 
W(p
m) < W(αi) < W(p
c). 
 
Any point in the relevant range of the transformation function is a possible point 
of tangency and possesses a positive probability, since in phase 1 the relative 
influence of interest groups is unknown.
6 A welfare loss due to over-regulation 
can be expected almost with certainty (consumer interest maximisation is only a 
special case), the magnitude of the welfare loss depending on the relative 
strength of the interest groups. Based on the risk measure introduced in section 
2.2, regulatory risk in competitive network areas can be measured as follows: 




c ) ( W ) p ( W α θ ρ  (5) 
                                                 
5   Regulatory agencies usually have a broad set of regulatory instruments available to 
pursue their goals. A differentiated analysis of these instruments would not lead to 
further insights in the present context. To simplify the exposition it is assumed that 
the agency can reach any desired point on the transformation function by adjusting 
the price. 
6   In figure 1 three M-isoquants are displayed as examples, each representing a differ-
ent value of αi.    11
The telecommunications sector in Europe is an illustrative example. The regula-
tory mandate specified in the Framework Directive and the Access Directive 
provides unspecific regulatory obligations with a subsequent large scope for dis-
cretion by the different regulatory agencies in Europe (cf. Blankart, Knieps, 
Zenhäusern, 2007, pp. 416 f.). In markets that are competitive, irrespective of 
country-specific characteristics, contradictory conclusions have been drawn by 
different national regulatory agencies and these were accepted by the European 
Commission. The Swedish and Finnish regulatory agencies concluded that their 
international call markets are effectively competitive, whereas in Hungary, Por-
tugal, and Ireland these markets were considered to be in need of being regu-
lated. A large number of cases regarding ex ante regulation have been assessed 
by the European Commission, but a consistent treatment from a normative point 
of view is still lacking (cf. Knieps, 2005, pp. 79-80). 
 
 
4  Regulatory risk in non-competitive network areas 
 
The discretionary behaviour of regulatory agencies has been especially dis-
cussed in connection with missing investment incentives in regulated industries 
due to regulatory opportunism (e.g. Newbery, 2000; Gans, King, 2003). The 
problem of regulatory agencies not adhering to original agreements (e.g. com-
pensation rules) was already noticed by Kolbe, Tye, Myers (1993). They call it 
"problem of moral hazard" (p. 53) and find it to be unsolvable. They illustrate it 
with the gunfighter example: 
"The problem of moral hazard may be illustrated by a somewhat whimsical 
example. Suppose a world famous gunfighter invites a tenderfoot to a poker 
game, but reserves the right to pull out his gun and change the rules at any 
time. What up-front risk premium does the tenderfoot require if he is to join 
the game? [...] If the risk premium itself is also subject to seizure during the 
game (i.e., if the amount of the potential loss is also under the control of the 
gunfighter), there is no risk premium great enough to induce the tenderfoot 
to play because the tenderfoot can never hope to do anything but lose all as-
sets brought to the table. The game never takes place" (Kolbe, Tye, Myers, 
1993, pp. 53 f., footnote omitted). 
   12
What Kolbe, Tye, Myers refer to as "moral hazard" is usually termed "opportun-
ism", leading to the problem of underinvestment.
7 The gunfighter is in a sense 
the perfect opportunist.  
 
Whereas the literature on regulatory opportunism only focuses on phase 2, the 
explicit introduction of phase 1 of the two-phases approach is required (as out-
lined in section 2.2) in order to derive the regulatory risk due to the problem that 
the regulatory agency cannot be committed to welfare-maximising behaviour 
(see Fig. 3). Because of the sequential nature of the irreversible investment deci-
sion by the regulated firms (stage 2a) and the access regulation to the monopo-
listic bottleneck implemented by the regulatory agency (stage 2b) a regulation 
induced hold-up problem arises, depending on the relative influence of interest 
groups. It is important to note that investment takes place in phase 2, i.e. after 
realisation of M(αi) is known. It will be shown that this leads to an underinvest-
ment problem which cannot be overcome by the regulatory agency itself.  
 
Figure 3: The two-phases approach in non-competitive network areas 
 
Phase 1  Phase 2 
Legislatory body sets 
the regulatory framework 




regulation  (incl. the mandate) 
M(αi) as a deterministic function  M(•) as a stochastic function 
 
To elaborate the concept of regulatory risk in non-competitive network areas, in 
the following (as before in section 3) the case of a regulatory agency with unlim-
ited discretionary powers to regulate firms in non-competitive network areas 
                                                 
7   The term "moral hazard" is misleading, because – as will be shown – this is not a 
problem of asymmetric information.   13
will be analysed. The starting point is the modelling framework developed in 
Besanko, Spulber (1992), considering the most simple case of a regulated firm 
facing an inelastic demand. Besanko, Spulber concentrate only on phase 2. Their 
framework will be generalised by means of a transition from a deterministic in-
fluence function M(αi) to a stochastic influence function M(•). Thus the legisla-
tive phase 1 of determining the regulatory mandate will be considered explicitly.  
 
The production technology in the regulated market is characterised by irreversi-
ble investments. The more capital is irreversibly invested ex ante, the lower the 
operating cost ex post. In Phase 2 two stages have to be distinguished. At both 
stages one central decision has to be made. At stage 2a investment takes place, 
and at stage 2b production and consumption. To simplify the exposition the out-




At the beginning of stage 2a the regulated firm decides upon the magnitude of 
its capital investment K, which cannot be altered at stage 2b. The cost per unit of 
capital investment is r and has to be covered at stage 2b.
9 The magnitude of K is 
determined by the regulated firm. In the present simplified context it is assumed 
that the regulatory agency determines the regulated price p at the beginning of 
stage 2b. When setting the price the agency is influenced by interest groups, re-
presented by the Cobb-Douglas influence function 
    (6) 
i i
gross i gross i ) ; , ( M ) ( M
α α π α π α ⋅ Ω = Ω =
− 1
In this case the producer surplus πgross does not represent the net profit (πnet), but 
the gross profit of the firm (contribution margin), i.e. before subtracting the op-
portunity cost of the capital investment. This difference is central to the argu-
ment. The reason for ignoring all capital cost in the price setting process is its 
irrelevance for all interest groups (and therefore also the regulatory agency), be-
cause at stage 2b their magnitude (r · K) can no longer be altered.  
                                                 
8   Therefore all investments, prices, profits etc. can be normalised on one unit of out-
put. 
9   The problem of discounting can thus be neglected. It is assumed that r represents all 
relevant opportunity cost (depreciation and interest) of the capital investment.   14












At stage 2b it is only redistribution that matters. What is available for redistribu-
tion is the difference V – c(K) between the willingness to pay of consumers per 
unit of output (V) and the operating costs per unit of output (c). V as well as c is 
identical for every unit of output. V is a parameter and c is a function c(K) with 
the following properties: c' < 0 and c'' > 0. For every unit of output Ω = V – p 
denotes the consumer surplus and πgross = p – c(K) denotes the gross profit of the 
regulated firm. The magnitude of K, as decided at stage 2a, determines the 
amount available for redistribution at stage 2b. The more capital is invested at 
stage 2a, the lower the operating cost and the larger the amount available for re-
distribution. The transformation function introduced in section 3 (see T in figure 
2) simplifies to a straight line with a negative slope of 45°. The central differ-








a(α1)   15
ence is that the position of T is not given exogenously any more, but depends on 
the capital investment K, which in itself depends (in equilibrium) on the regu-
lated price and is therefore influenced by the interest groups. If more capital is 
invested this leads to a shift of the transformation function in the direction of the 
upper right corner (see figure 4).
10
 
In the modelling framework of Besanko, Spulber all stochastic elements are ab-
sent. Without any stochastic element the prerequisite of any risk consideration is 
missing. Not only ordinary market risk is ignored, but there is also no basis for 
the analysis of regulatory risk. To incorporate the possibility of regulatory risk 
along the lines of the approach introduced in section 3, a generalisation of Be-
sanko, Spulber (1992) seems to be straightforward. Since now phase 1 becomes 
relevant, α becomes a stochastic parameter. For every  ) , ( i 1 0 ∈ α  the regulated 
price, determined by the regulator at stage 2b influenced by interest groups, can 
be derived by maximisation of M(αi) subject to constraint T(K): 
 
    (7)  ) c V ( L gross gross
i i π λ π
α α − Ω − − + ⋅ Ω =
− 1











































Solving these equations simultaneously leads for every αi to the values 
   ) c V ( ) ( i − ⋅ − = Ω α 1  (11) 
   ) c V ( i gross − ⋅ =α π  (12) 
                                                 
10  This is a modified version of Besanko, Spulber (1992, p. 157, fig. 1), generalised for 
a stochastic influence function M(•).   16
Recognising that c depends on the magnitude of K as chosen at stage 2a, we can 
characterise the regulated price p at stage 2b as  
   ) K ( c ) ( V ) , K ( p i i i ⋅ − + ⋅ = α α α 1  (13) 
 
If the regulator maximises consumer surplus (special case α = 0), he only allows 
the recovering of the operating costs c(K). If, on the contrary, the regulator 
maximises gross profit (special case α = 1), the price is as high as the consum-
ers’ willingness to pay and extracts all consumer surplus.  
 
The costs of the capital investment are irrelevant when the regulatory agency 
sets the price at stage 2b; however, they are highly relevant for the regulated 
firm when determining the investment level K at stage 2a. The firm will antici-
pate the effect of K on p when maximising its objective function (net profit): 
   K r ) K ( c V K r ) K ( c ) , K ( p ) , K ( i i i i net ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ − − = α α α α π  (14) 
 
The optimal investment level K* of the firm, maximising net profit subject to 








= − ≡ −  (15) 
The relative influence of the interest groups is of central importance. The more 
the regulator is influenced by consumer interests, the less will be invested. More 
interesting is the comparison with the welfare optimum. Due to the assumption 
of an inelastic demand the only relevant criteria for welfare optimisation is cost 
minimisation by setting K adequately. The total cost per unit of output consists 
of the operating cost c(K) and the cost of the capital investment rK. The cost-
minimal capital investment K
Opt is reached, when 
   r ' c
dK
dc
= − ≡ −  (16)   17
In the special case α = 0 there is no investment at all, because any investment 
would lead to a negative net profit.
11 For all parameter values  ) , ( i 1 0 ∈ α  there is 
some investment, but the chosen level K* is lower than the cost-minimising (and 
welfare-optimal) level K
Opt. Only in the special case α = 1 does the net-profit-
maximising investment level K* equal the cost minimising level K
Opt.  
 
From a social welfare point of view the reference point is the total cost mini-
mum c(K
Opt) + rK
Opt, which can be used to calibrate risk measures – in analogy 
to the ones introduced in section 3.
12 Depending on αi the lower investment level 
K*(αi) < K
Opt results in a welfare loss whose magnitude is measured by the 
waste of costs 
    (17) 
Opt Opt
i i K r ) K ( c ) ( * K r )) ( * K ( c ⋅ − − ⋅ + α α
Therefore a measure of regulatory risk in non-competitive network areas can be 
stated as follows: 
    (18) 
Opt Opt
i
i i i nc K r ) K ( c )] ( * K r )) ( * K ( c [ ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ =∑ α α θ ρ
 
 
5  The necessity of institutional reform 
 
5.1  The impossibility of compensating for regulatory risk 
 
As a means of compensating for regulatory risk in non-competitive network   
areas the concept of access holidays has recently gained interest in the current 
debate on regulation. Access holidays means an obligation on the part of the 
regulatory agency to not regulate a new infrastructure facility during an ex ante 
pre-determined time period in order to avoid underinvestment incentives. It is 
assumed that the regulatory agency is able to credibly commit to access holi-
                                                 
11  This case corresponds to the case analysed in Newbery (2000, pp. 35 f.) using a  
deterministic, linear influence function. 
12  In the present modelling framework the determination of minimal total cost is not 
problematic, because of the assumed absence of any market risk that could lead to  
estimation errors à la Ahn/Thompson (1989).   18
days, despite the fact that it is not able to credibly commit to ex post access 
prices. The idea is that access holidays should create incentives to invest the  
optimal amount of capital from a social welfare point of view (cf. Gans, King, 
2003, pp. 168 f.). 
 
In the simple modelling framework of Besanko, Spulber (1992) the calculation 
of the necessary revenues for covering total cost is straightforward. This also 
holds in more complex settings with asymmetric market risks, where the com-
pensation can be calculated in analogy to the risk of "junk bonds" (cf. Kolbe, 
Tye, Myers, 1993, p. 25, fig. 2-2).
13 Depending on the specifics of the relevant 
investment project, different revenues for covering the expected cost are neces-
sary. But the original source of the problem does not disappear after calculating 
the necessary cost recovery, because the real problem is the missing ability of 
the regulatory agency to make ex ante credible commitments regarding the regu-
lated prices ex post (cf. Gans, King, 2003, pp. 168 ff.). 
 
The question arises, however, whether the problem of regulatory opportunism 
can really be solved within phase 2 by shifting the regulatory intervention from 
the ex post (stage 2b) to the ex ante situation (stage 2a) and simplifying the 
regulatory parameter (price regulation versus length of regulation). For every 
future realisation of M(αi) the regulatory agency has different incentives to break 
the promised agreement about the length of the access holidays (depending on 
the relative future strength of influence of the interest groups). The problem of 
regulatory opportunism cannot be solved by means of a simplification of the 
regulatory parameter. The root of the problem is to be found in the inability of 
the regulatory agency to commit itself to welfare-maximising solutions due to a 
stochastic M-function (arising in phase 1). The regulatory risk carries forward 
into missing compensation and missing commitment to access holidays. 
 
                                                 
13  The underinvestment problem can also be modelled in a setting with market risks, 
incorporating the possibility of a project being a "flop" (cf. Newbery, 2000, chap. 2; 
Gans, King, 2003). But this was done with a deterministic M-function, i.e. there is 
some market risk but no regulatory risk. In the present case of a stochastic   
M-function the extent of underinvestment is stochastic, depending on the influence 
of interest groups.   19
5.2  The disaggregated regulatory mandate 
 
Due to the regulatory agency’s lack of commitment capability in relation to the 
regulated sector, regulatory risk cannot be compensated for. Instead, the institu-
tional solution to this problem can be found in a reform of the regulatory man-
date by the legislator. Only by imposing an appropriate constraint of the regula-
tory agency’s discretionary freedom of action can the regulatory agency achieve 
commitment capability to implement welfare-maximising behaviour and thus 
reduce regulatory risk. 
 
In the regulatory mandate the competencies of the regulatory agency for imple-
menting regulation are prescribed. The regulatory mandate has to be embedded 
within the legal framework of regulation. Reform efforts must start with the re-
design of the regulatory mandate by statutory constraints to limit the discretion-
ary behaviour of the regulatory agency and subsequently the influence of inter-
est groups. As regards the remaining field of activity, however, the expertise of 
the relevant regulatory agency should be trusted. In the following, the basic ele-
ments of a disaggregated regulatory mandate based on disaggregated regulatory 
economics will be presented (cf. Knieps, 2005, pp. 87 f.).  
 
The regulatory risk in competitive network areas, as characterised in section 3, 
can be avoided if the following constraints to regulatory agencies are imple-
mented by law: 
(1)  Prohibition of regulatory interventions leading to market closure. Market 
entry and exit must be possible in all network areas. 
(2)  Prohibition of market power regulation outside of network areas – func-
tionally defined by the legislator – where monopolistic bottlenecks may 
still exist. All other network areas are competitive and only subject to gen-
eral competition law. 
(3)  Adherence to a differentiated localisation and regulation of monopolistic 
bottlenecks; the necessity of this regulation is to be reviewed periodically 
(due to the phasing-out potentials of monopolistic bottlenecks).   20
Regulatory risk in non-competitive network areas, as characterised in section 4, 
can be reduced if the following obligations to regulatory agencies are imple-
mented: 
(1)  To apply price-cap regulation for disciplining the market power of mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks in combination with accounting separation. 
(2)  Not to disturb the financial viability of the regulated firm by inadequate 
application of price-cap regulation. When determining the lower limit of 
the price level (cost recovery constraint), the point of reference should be 
decision-relevant cost, including opportunity cost of capital investment. 
 
The disaggregated regulatory mandate constitutes a binding constraint of the 
regulatory agency’s freedom of action and thus reduces the regulatory risk of an 
excessive regulatory base as well as the regulatory risk of underinvestment. 
 
   21
Literature 
 
Ahn, Chang Mo, Thompson, Howard E. (1989), "An Analysis of Some Aspects 
of Regulatory Risk and the Required Rate of Return for Public Utilities", 
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 1, pp. 241-257. 
Becker, Gary S. (1983), "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for 
Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3,   
pp. 371-400. 
Besanko, David, Spulber, Daniel F. (1992), "Sequential-Equilibrium Investment 
by Regulated Firms", Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp.   
153-170. 
Blankart, Charles B., Knieps, Günter, Zenhäusern, Patrick (2007), "Regulation 
of New Markets in Telecommunications: Market Dynamics and Shrinking 
Monopolistic Bottlenecks", European Business Organization Law Review, 
Vol. 8, pp. 413-428. 
Buckland, Roger, Fraser, Patricia (2001), "Political and Regulatory Risk in Wa-
ter Utilities: Beta Sensitivity in the United Kingdom", Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 28, No. 7-8, pp. 877-904. 
Ebert, Udo (2005), "Zur Messung von Risiko", in: S. Müller, T. Jöhnk and A. 
Bruns (eds.), Beiträge zum Finanz-, Rechnungs- und Bankwesen: Stand 
und Perspektiven, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp. 17-33. 
Ergas, Henry et al. (2001), Regulatory Risk, Paper prepared for the ACCC 
Regulation and Investment Conference, Manly, 26-27 March, Draft   
Version. 
Gaggero, Alberto A. (2007), "Regulatory Risk in the Utilities Industry: An   
Empirical Study of the English-Speaking Countries", Utilities Policy, Vol. 
15, No. 3, pp. 191-205. 
Gans, Joshua, King, Stephen (2003), "Access Holidays for Network Infra-
structure Investment", Agenda, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 163-178. 
Knieps, Günter (1997), "Phasing out Sector-Specific Regulation in Competitive 
Telecommunications", Kyklos, Vol. 50, Fasc. 3, pp. 325-339.   22
Knieps, Günter (2005), "Telecommunications Markets in the Stranglehold of EU 
Regulation: On the Need for a Disaggregated Regulatory Contract",   
Journal of Network Industries, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 75-93. 
Knieps, Günter (2006), "Sector-Specific Market Power Regulation versus Gen-
eral Competition Law: Criteria for Judging Competitive versus Regulated 
Markets", in: F.P. Sioshansi und W. Pfaffenberger (eds.), Electricity  
Market Reform: An International Perspective, Elsevier, Amsterdam et al., 
pp. 49-74. 
Kolbe, A. Lawrence, Tye, William B., Myers, Stewart C. (1993), Regulatory 
Risk: Economic Principles and Applications to Natural Gas Pipelines and 
other Industries, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/London. 
Maertens, Sven (2005), "Liberalisierung notwendig: Intercity-Busverkehr in 
Deutschland, Internationales Verkehrswesen, Vol. 57, No. 6, pp. 251-256. 
Myers, Stewart C. (1972), "The Application of Finance Theory to Public Utility 
Rate Cases", Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, pp. 58-97. 
Newbery, David M. (2000), Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of 
 Network Utilities, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.) and London. 
Peltzman, Sam (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation", Journal 
of Law and Economics, Vol. 19, August, pp. 211-240. 
Posner, Richard A. (1974), "Theories of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 335-358. 
Spulber, Daniel F. (1989), Regulation and Markets, MIT Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.) and London. 
Spulber, Daniel F., Besanko, David (1992), "Delegation, Commitment, and the 
Regulatory Mandate", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 
8, No. 1, pp. 126-154. 
Stigler, George J. (1971), "The Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal 
of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, S. 3-21. 
Stone, Bernell K. (1973), "A General Class of Three-Parameter Risk Measures", 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 675-685.   23
Weingast, Barry R.,Moran, Mark J. (1983), "Bureaucratic Discretion or   
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade 
Commission", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 5, pp. 765-800. 
Weiss, Hans-Jörg (2006), "Die Probleme des ÖPNV aus netzökonomischer 
Sicht", in: Lasch, Rainer, Lemke, Arne (eds.), Wege zu einem zukunfts-
trächtigen ÖPNV: Rahmenbedingungen und Strategien im Spannungsfeld 
von Markt und Politik, Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, pp. 119-147. 
Wright, Stephen, Mason, Robin, Miles, David (2003), A Study into Certain   
Aspects of the Cost of Capital for Regulated Utilities in the U.K., Report 
commissioned by the U.K. Economic Regulators and the Office of Fair 
Trading, London, February. 
   24
Als Diskussionsbeiträge des  
Instituts für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik 
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br. 
sind zuletzt erschienen: 
 
95.   G. Knieps: Neuere Entwicklungen in der Verkehrsökonomie: Der disaggregierte An-
satz, erschienen in: Nordrhein-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hrsg.), 
Symposium „Transportsysteme und Verkehrspolitik“, Vorträge 17, Schöningh-Verlag, 
Paderborn, 2004, S. 13-25 
96.   G.  Knieps: Telekommunikationsmärkte zwischen Regulierung und Wettbewerb, er-
schienen in: Nutzinger, H.G. (Hrsg.), Regulierung, Wettbewerb und Marktwirtschaft, 
Festschrift für Carl Christian von Weizsäcker, Verlag Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003, 
S. 203-220 
97.   G.  Knieps: Wettbewerb auf den europäischen Transportmärkten: Das Problem der 
Netzzugänge, erschienen in: Fritsch, M. (Hrsg.), Marktdynamik und Innovation – Ge-
dächtnisschrift für Hans-Jürgen Ewers, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2004, S. 221-236 
98.   G.  Knieps: Verkehrsinfrastruktur, erschienen in: Akademie für Raumforschung und 
Landesplanung (Hrsg.), Handwörterbuch der Raumordnung, Hannover 2005, S. 1213-
1219 
99.   G. Knieps: Limits to the (De-)Regulation of Transport Services, erschienen als: “Delim-
iting Regulatory Needs” in: OECD/EMCT Round Table 129, Transport Services: The 
Limits of (De)regulation, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2006, S.7-31 
100.  G. Knieps: Privatisation of Network Industries in Germany: A Disaggregated Approach, 
erschienen in: Köthenbürger, M., Sinn, H.-W., Whalley, J. (eds.), Privatization Experi-
ences in the European Union, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), London, 2006, S. 199-224 
101.  G. Knieps: Competition in the post-trade markets: A network economic analysis of the 
securities business, erschienen in: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Vol. 6, 
No. 1, 2006, S. 45-60 
102.  G. Knieps: Information and communication technologies in Germany: Is there a remain-
ing role for sector specific regulations?, erschienen in: Moerke, A., Storz, C. (Hrsg.), 
Competitiveness of New Industries. Institutional Framework and learning in information 
technology in Japan, the US and Germany, Routledge, London, New York, 2007,   
S. 57-73  
103.  G. Knieps: Von der Theorie angreifbarer Märkte zur Theorie monopolistischer Bottle-
necks, in: Daumann, F., Okruch, S., Mantzavinos, C. (Hrsg.), Wettbewerb und Gesund-
heitswesen: Konzeptionen und Felder ordnungsökonomischen Wirkens, Festschrift für 
Peter Oberender, Andrássy Schriftenreihe, Bd. 4, Budapest 2006, S. 141-159 
104.  G. Knieps: The Different Role of Mandatory Access in German Regulation of Railroads 
and Telecommunications, erschienen in: Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 
Vol. 2/1, 2006, S. 149-158 
   25
105.  G. Knieps: Aktuelle Vorschläge zur Preisregulierung natürlicher Monopole, erschienen 
in: K.-H. Hartwig, A. Knorr (Hrsg.), Neuere Entwicklungen in der Infrastrukturpolitik, 
Beiträge aus dem Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft an der Universität Münster, Heft 
157, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2005, S. 305-320 
106.  G. Aberle: Zukünftige Entwicklung des Güterverkehrs: Sind Sättigungsgrenzen erkenn-
bar? Februar 2005 
107.  G.  Knieps: Versorgungssicherheit und Universaldienste in Netzen: Wettbewerb mit 
Nebenbedingungen? erschienen in: Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Verkehrswissenschaft-
lichen Gesellschaft: Versorgungssicherheit und Grundversorgung in offenen Netzen, 
Reihe B, B 285, 2005, S. 11-25 
108. H.-J. Weiß: Die Potenziale des Deprival Value-Konzepts zur entscheidungsorientierten 
Bewertung von Kapital in liberalisierten Netzindustrien, Juni 2005 
109.  G. Knieps: Telecommunications markets in the stranglehold of EU regulation: On the 
need for a disaggregated regulatory contract, erschienen in: Journal of Network Indus-
tries, Vol. 6, 2005, S. 75-93 
110.  H.-J.  Weiß: Die Probleme des ÖPNV aus netzökonomischer Sicht, erschienen in: 
Lasch, Rainer/Lemke, Arne (Hrsg.), Wege zu einem zukunftsträchtigen ÖPNV: Rah-
menbedingungen und Strategien im Spannungsfeld von Markt und Politik, Erich 
Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, 2006, S. 119-147 
111.  G. Knieps: Die LKW-Maut und die drei Grundprobleme der Verkehrsinfrastrukturpoli-
tik, erschienen in: Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Verkehrswissenschaftlichen Gesell-
schaft: Die LKW-Maut als erster Schritt in eine neue Verkehrsinfrastrukturpolitik, Reihe 
B, B 292, 2006, S. 56-72 
112.   C.B. Blankart, G. Knieps, P. Zenhäusern: Regulation of New Markets in Telecom-
munications? Market dynamics and shrinking monopolistic bottlenecks, erschienen in: 
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), Vol. 8, 2007, S. 413-428 
113.  G. Knieps: Wettbewerbspotenziale im Nahverkehr: Perspektiven und institutionelle 
Barrieren, erschienen in: Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Verkehrswissenschaftlichen Ge-
sellschaft: Warten auf Wettbewerb: ÖPNV in Deutschland, Reihe B, 2007, S. 11-23  
114.  F. Birke: Universaldienstregulierung in der Telekommunikation heute: Herausforderun-
gen, Chancen und Risiken – Ein historischer Ansatz, Mai 2007 
115.  G. Knieps, P. Zenhäusern: The fallacies of network neutrality regulation, Paper pre-
sented at the 18th European Regional ITS Conference, September 2-5, 2007, in Istan-
bul, revised version: September 2007 
116. G. Knieps: Disaggregierte Regulierung in Netzsektoren: Normative und positive Theo-
rie, erschienen in: in: Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 31/3, 2007, S. 229-236 
117. G. Knieps, H.-J. Weiß: Reduction of Regulatory Risk: A Network Economic   
Approach, erscheint in: Tagungsband zur Konferenz über Regulierungsrisiken in Halle, 
März 2007, Nomos Verlag 
118.   G. Knieps, H.-J. Weiß: Regulatory Agencies and Regulatory Risk, Regulatory Risk, 
Revised Version: January 2008  
 